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Alfano: Look What Katz Leaves Out: Why DNA Collection Challenges the Scop

NOTE
LOOK WHAT KA TZ LEAVES OUT:
WHY DNA COLLECTION CHALLENGES THE
SCOPE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
It has been almost forty years since Justice Harlan redefined the
scope of constitutional protection against unreasonable searches in Katz
v. United States.1 Historically, the Fourth Amendment was only
implicated if the government trespassed on property explicitly protected
by the text of the amendment itself.2 In Katz, Justice Harlan moved away
from the property-paradigm and stated that in order to be recognized as a
search: (1) a person must have "exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy"; and (2) that expectation must be "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' 3 Shortly thereafter,
Justice Harlan questioned the wisdom of his own creation, observing
that "[o]ur expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part
reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the
past and present. '4
Since then, a vast body of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
been erected on the Katz principle. Simultaneously, technology has
presented law enforcement with capabilities unfathomable only a few
decades ago. Chief among these scientific breakthroughs is law
enforcement's use of DNA evidence to investigate and prosecute
suspects with an astounding degree of certaintyf DNA and its related
1. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
2. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961) (holding that a Fourth
Amendment violation requires physical intrusion on constitutionally protected property).
3. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
4. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("While these
formulations represent an advance over the unsophisticated trespass analysis of the common law,
they too have their limitations and can, ultimately, lead to the substitution of words for analysis.").
5. Deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") is composed of two molecular strands, "oriented in
opposite directions," which employ "a digital code similar to that used by computers." Leroy Hood
& Lee Rowen, Genes, Genomes, and Society, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 3, 3-4 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997). The language of the
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issues have been central to compelling celebrity trials, 6 and the public's

renewed fascination with crime scene investigation, forensics, and law
enforcement in general has made DNA a household name. As the
technology continues to advance, the question begs answering: Will law

enforcement's collection of DNA fulfill Justice Harlan's foreboding
prophecy and expose the shortcomings of the Katz principle?
Specifically, can existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence bring DNA
collection within its scope if the physicality of the collection method is

eliminated and no dignitary interests are implicated?
In Part I, this Note will introduce the Supreme Court's
"intrusiveness paradigm" and "public exposure doctrine"--two progeny
of the Katz reasonable expectations of privacy principle-and discuss
how courts have applied them to federal and state DNA legislation to
find DNA collection to constitute a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Part II will propose hypothetical applications of the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in light of
technological advancements which render DNA collection less intrusive,
code derives from variations in the order of guanine, cytosine, adenine, and thymine paired across
the molecular strands to form a "unit of information" known as a "gene." Id. "DNA is contained in
the nucleus of virtually all cells of every living organism" and "the entirety of an individual
organism's DNA is referred to as its genome." See Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA
DatabaseSearches and the Legal Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REV. 931, 934
(1999). Except for identical twins, no two human beings share the identical DNA code throughout
the entire genome. Id. at 935; see also Richard Willing, Identical Twins Complicate Use of DNA
Testing in Crime Solving, USA TODAY, June 3, 2004, at 36 (reporting that the DNA of identical
twins in custody on unrelated charges matches genetic material recovered after the unsolved rape of
a college student in 1999 and "raises scientific and legal issues that appear likely to occur more
frequently as samples are added to the nation's computerized DNA databases").
6. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord
Broughman and the O.J. Simpson Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 291, 303-04 (1998)
(describing how the Simpson defense team initially requested a month-long hearing on the scientific
admissibility of DNA evidence); CourtTV.com, Bryant Prosecutors: DNA Evidence Potentially
Contaminated, at http://www.courttv.com/trials/bryant/082504_dna ap.html (last visited May 23,
2005) ("Crucial DNA evidence tested by defense experts in the Kobe Bryant sexual assault case
might have been contaminated ..
"); Dan Whitcomb, ABC News, Jackson's Lawyer Says Pop
Star to Tell Own Story, at http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/wireStory?id 542186 (last visited
May 23, 2005) (Michael Jackson's'attorney argued during opening statements that "his client was
the naive victim of a scheming family and that there was no DNA evidence of the sexual abuse
charged by the prosecution.").
7. For the week of March 7-13, 2005, six law enforcement television programs that
frequently depict the collection of DNA evidence were among the Nielsen Media Research Top 20
in ratings, including: CS! (No. 1, viewed in an estimated 19,775,000 households), CS!: Miami (No.
6, estimated 15,331,000 households), Cold Case (No. 10, estimated 11,521,000 households), Law &
Order: Criminal Intent (No. 13, estimated 11,032,000 households), Law & Order: SVU (No. 14,
estimated 11,110,000 households), and Law & Order (No. 20, estimated 9,013,000 households). See
Yahoo! TV: Nielsen Media Research Top 20, Week of March 7-13, 2005, at
http://tv.yahoo.com/nielsen/ (visited Mar. 21, 2004).
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as well as indications of judicial anxiety regarding the impending
realization that non-intrusive DNA collection is outside the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection contemplated by the Katz progeny. Part
III will note the legitimate policy concerns of those on both sides of the
hot topic of expanding DNA databases, suggest that either alternative
judicial paradigms or legislation is necessary to safeguard the collection
and use of DNA, and consider whether the judiciary or the legislature is
best equipped to implement safeguards that address non-intrusive DNA
collection.
1.

KATZ PROGENY AND PRIOR TREATMENT OF DNA COLLECTION

Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Katz, the reasonable
expectations of privacy principle gave birth to several complimentary
legal doctrines. Among these doctrines introduced in cases are "the
intrusiveness paradigm," as well as "the public exposure doctrine." This
Note focuses on these two doctrines because they are the most relevant
in determining whether the collection of DNA samples and the
subsequent storage of these samples in DNA databases constitute a
"search" within the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.
A.

The Intrusiveness Paradigm

One derivative of the Katz standard is the intrusiveness paradigm,
in which the Supreme Court has recognized that "the integrity of an
individual's person is a cherished value of our society" and therefore the
Fourth Amendment only permits "minor intrusions into an individual's
body under stringently limited conditions."' The issue of governmental
bodily intrusions under the Fourth Amendment was first addressed in
Schmerber v. California,where Justice Brennan stated that in "dealing
with intrusions into the human body rather than with state interferences
with property relationships or private papers ... we write on a clean
slate." 9 This Note will discuss how the Court has subsequently focused
on the physicality of the intrusion as the hinge to Fourth Amendment
protection.
In Schmerber, an individual was arrested at a hospital while
receiving treatment for injuries suffered in a car accident. ° The arresting
officer directed a physician to take a sample of blood, despite the

8. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 767-68.
10. Id.at 758.
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patient's refusal, in order to conduct a chemical analysis and confirm his
suspicion that the patient was driving while intoxicated." The Court held
that the "compulsory administration of a blood test ...plainly involves
the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment."' 2 Nevertheless, the Court found the search constitutionally
permissible, because among other reasons, "the test was performed in a
reasonable manner" by a "physician in a hospital environment" and there
was no "unjustified element of personal risk of infection and pain.' 3
In order to conduct a search of an individual's body, the individual4
must either consent to the search or be detained involuntarily.'
Consequently, it is important to distinguish between the intrusiveness of
the search and the intrusiveness of the detention of the person. The
Supreme Court did just that in Davis v. Mississippi, a rape case where
the victim gave the police a general description of her assailant as a
"Negro youth" and the police, without warrants, then "took at least 24
Negro youths to police headquarters where they were questioned briefly,
fingerprinted, and then released without charge., 15 The Court found that
fingerprinting "constitute[s] a much less serious intrusion upon personal
security than other types of police searches and detentions" because it
"involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and
thoughts that marks an interrogation or search" and is an "inherently
more reliable and effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness
identifications or confessions. ' 6 However, the Court held that the
government's seizure of the petitioner's person was within the Fourth
Amendment's scope of protection, and that this protection was violated
because "the detention at police headquarters of petitioner and the other
young Negroes was not authorized by a judicial officer."17
The Supreme Court first harmonized the intrusiveness paradigm
with the public exposure doctrine (discussed in depth below) in Cupp v.
Murphy, where a woman was found deceased from strangulation and the
police compelled her husband, without a warrant, to submit to fingernail
scrapings against his will in order to test for the presence of traces of the

11.
12.
13.

Id. at 758-59.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 771-72.

14.

See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.

15.
16.

394 U.S. 721, 722-23 (1969).
Id. at 727.

17.

Id.at 728.
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victim's skin and blood cells.' 8 The Court used the physicality of the
intrusiveness paradigm in order to justify a very technical application of
the public exposure doctrine, holding that, "the search of the
'physical
beyond
mere
went
respondent's
fingernails
characteristics... constantly exposed to the public,' and constituted the
type of 'severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security'
that is subject to constitutional scrutiny."' 9 In essence, the Court held
that the undersides of our fingernails are within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment, whereas the outside of the nails-which are constantly
exposed to the public-are not.
The Court further developed the relationship between public
exposure and intrusiveness in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Association, summarizing that:
[W]here, as here, the Government seeks to obtain physical evidence
from a person, the Fourth Amendment may be relevant at several
levels. The initial detention necessary to procure the evidence may be a
seizure of the person.., if the detention amounts to a meaningful
interference with his freedom of movement. Obtaining and examining
the evidence may also be a search ...if doing so infringes an

expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.2 °
In Skinner, the court analyzed railway regulations that mandated
blood and urine tests of employees involved in train accidents, and
authorized the railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees
who violate certain safety rules. 2 1 The Court easily found the blood tests
to be within the Fourth Amendment's scope under Schmerber, observing
that "it is obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the
skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. 22 Similarly, the Court relied on the physicality
of breathalyzer tests which "generally requires the production of alveolar
18. 412 U.S. 291, 292-93 (1973). Although the husband was briefly detained at the
stationhouse, the police had probable cause to believe that he committed the murder and
consequently the "vice of the detention in Davis is therefore absent." Id. at 294-95.
19. Id. at 295 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) and Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968), respectively).
20. 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 606. The Fourth Amendment's protection is limited to "invasive acts by officers of
the government or those acting at their direction." Id. at 613-14. The railroad officials were found to
be acting at the direction of the government because the Court found that "specific features of the
regulations combine to convince us that the Government did more than adopt a passive position
toward the underlying private conduct." Id. at 615.
22. Id. at 616.
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or 'deep lung' breath" as the basis to conclude that the test "implicates
similar concerns about bodily integrity" and should be deemed a
search.23 The implication is that the test only constitutes a search
because "deep lung breath" exceeds the normal expulsion of air we
constantly expose to the public and consequently is an intrusion of
bodily integrity.
More problematic for the Court in Skinner was the issue of the
collection and testing of urine samples. The Court was precluded from
applying the intrusiveness paradigm in some attenuated fashion because
24
"urine samples do not entail a surgical intrusion into the body."
Instead, the Court identified two reasons why urine analysis implicates
privacy interests. First, "chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood,
can reveal a host of private medical facts."25 Secondly, the "visual or
aural monitoring of the act of urination" that is often a component of the
collection process "'is a function traditionally performed without public
observation"' and "'its performance in public is generally prohibited by
law.' ' 26 For the combination of these reasons, the Court held that the
collection and testing of urine constitutes a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.2 7
B. The Public Exposure Doctrine
In Katz, the Supreme Court asserted that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection., 28 From this broad mandate
emerged a line of cases commonly thought to comprise what is known as
the public exposure doctrine. Analysis of these cases indicates that even
when subjective expectations of privacy from a particular type of search
exist, they are trumped by the determination that the fruits of the

23. Id. at 616-17 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 617.
25. Id. (stating that urine analysis could reveal that an employee is "epileptic, pregnant, or
diabetic"). Similar concerns are raised by DNA analysis, and this precedent is the greatest obstacle
to this Note's assertion that non-intrusive governmental collection of DNA falls outside the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection according to existing precedent. This issue will be explored further
throughout this Note.
26. Id. (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir.
1987)).
27.

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.

28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). This was in accord with the paradigm
shift from property rights to reasonable expectations of privacy, embodied in the principle that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Id.
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challenged search were accessible to the public-and therefore no
objective expectation of privacy can reasonably exist.
For example, in United States v. Dionisio, an individual was
subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury and furnish a voice exemplar
in order to aid the grand jury in their investigatory role.2 9 Relying upon
Katz, the Court held that "no person can have a reasonable expectation
that others will not know the sound of his voice." 30 The Court reasoned
that a man's voice is "repeatedly produced for others to hear," and
therefore the required disclosure is "immeasurably further removed from
the Fourth Amendment protection than was the intrusion into the body
effected by the blood 3extraction in Schmerber" and more "like the
fingerprinting in Davis." 1
Similarly, in United States v. Mara, the Court held that,
"[h]andwriting, like speech, is repeatedly shown to the public, and there
is no more expectation of privacy in the physical characteristics of a
,,32
Mara makes it
person's script than there is in the tone of his voice.
clear that the expectation of privacy in the physical characteristic itself is
what is analyzed, not the expectation of privacy from whatever these
characteristics may reveal. It seems reasonable that an individual would
be unaware that her handwriting may be unique enough to scientifically
identify her signature on private, embarrassing, or potentially
incriminating documents.33 Nevertheless, such a use is permissible
29. 410 U.S. 1, 3 (1973). The Court made it clear that "a subpoena to appear before a grand
jury is not a 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment sense," and therefore "[t]his case is thus quite
different from Davis v. Mississippi" where "the initial seizure ...violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, not the taking of the fingerprints." Id. at 9, 11 (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 14. The court stated that it would be equally unreasonable for a man to "expect that
his face will be a mystery to the world." Id. Pursuant to this statement, facial recognition
identification software is likely outside the Fourth Amendment's scope. See Roberto Iraola, Lights,
Camera,Action!-Surveillance Cameras, FacialRecognition Systems and the Constitution,49 LOY.
L. REv. 773, 796-98 (2003) (concluding that "it appears to be no different from an officer's
comparing the face of a person he passes on the street with the photograph of a known criminal").
This technology was used to scan faces in the crowd at the stadium during Super Bowl XXXV in
Tampa, Florida, as well as in numerous airports after September 11, 2001, and compare "face
prints" to a database of criminals and suspected terrorists. Id. at783-84.
31. Dionisio,410U.S.at 14-15.
32. 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973).
33. "Like fingerprinting identifications, the basic premise behind handwriting analysis is that
no two persons write alike, and thus that forensic document examiners can reliably determine
authorship of a particular document by comparing itwith known samples." United States v. Crisp,
324 F.3d 261, 270 (4th Cir. 2003). "Before Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S.
579 (1993)], handwriting analysis testimony was admissible under the Frye [v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)] general acceptance standard" for scientific evidence. United States v.
Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002). Subsequent to the Supreme Court's adoption of
the Daubert standard for the admissibility of expert testimony, some courts excluded handwriting
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because handwriting is constantly exposed to the public and therefore
there is no objective expectation in keeping the handwriting from
governmental analysis.
The Supreme Court greatly expanded the concept of "public
exposure" in United States v. Miller, a case where federal agents
subpoenaed a bank to make a suspect's financial records available.34 The
Court held that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
In other words, even if the subjective expectation of privacy in
personal financial records is understandable, the Fourth Amendment
does not apply because the information is "voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
business," and3 therefore
6
does not exist.

The high-water mark of the public exposure doctrine is California
v. Greenwood, where an enterprising police officer directed a trash
collector to pick up the plastic garbage bags that a suspected narcotics
trafficker left on the curb in froht of his house and found incriminating

analysis on the grounds that there was "little known about the error rates of forensic document
examiners" which raised "serious questions about the reliability of methods currently in use."
United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103 (D. Alaska 2001). In response, Professor
Sargur Srihari conducted a study where his research team scanned the handwriting samples of 1,500
individuals into a computer and programmed the computer to analyze the samples "based on a
variety of features such as slant, height, the number of interior contours, and the number of vertical
slope components." Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 962 (discussing Sargur Srihari, Individuality of
Handwriting, 47 J. FORENSIC Sci. 856 (2002)). The computer was able to match the samples with a
remarkable 98% accuracy rate. Hidalgo,229 F. Supp. 2d at 962. Evidently, the United States Secret
Service was already aware that handwriting analysis is an efficient detection method, already having
in place the "Forensic Information System for Handwriting" ("FISH") which has been used to
match the handwriting of several suspects to letters threatening government officials. Id. On the
basis of these and other findings, courts now analogize handwriting analysis to fingerprint
identification and accept handwriting analysis as reliable under the Daubert standard. See, e.g.,
Crisp, 324 F.3d at 271.
34. 425 U.S. 435, 436-37 (1976).
35. Id. at 443; accord Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (When petitioner used his
phone he "voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business" and therefore "assumed the risk that
the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.").
36. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
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evidence in the rubbish.37 In its analysis, the Court conceded that "[i]t
may well be that respondents did not expect that the contents of their
garbage bags would become known to the police or other members of
the public. 3 8 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that "respondents
exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to
Fourth Amendment protection" because it is "common knowledge that
plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily
accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members
of the public."'39
The Supreme Court found the Skinner intrusiveness analysis
controlling in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, stating that urine tests
conducted by staff members of a state hospital for the purposes of
detecting and prosecuting prenatal patients using cocaine "were
40
indisputably searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.,
However, Justice Scalia's dissent distinguished Ferguson from Skinner
on the grounds that in the latter, "the urine was obtained involuntarily. ' 41
According to Justice Scalia, the only act "that could conceivably be
regarded as a search" is "the taking of the urine sample," not "the testing
of that urine for traces of unlawful drugs" because "the Fourth
Amendment protects only against searches of citizens' 'persons, houses,
papers, and effects'; and it is entirely unrealistic to regard urine as one of
the 'effects' (i.e., part of the property) of the person who has passed and

37. 486 U.S. 35, 37-38 (1988).
38. Id. at 39.
39. Id. at 40 (citations omitted). The Court noted that "we are distinctly unimpressed with the
dissent's prediction that 'society will be shocked to learn' of today's decision." Id. at 43 n.5
(citation omitted). Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the dissent's prediction was accurate.
For example, after the Oregon police department revealed that it has been standard practice for
narcotics officers to conduct bi-monthly "garbage pulls" for the past three decades, a local
newspaper decided "to turn the tables" on Portland's District Attorney, Police Chief, and Mayor in
order "to make a point about how invasive a 'garbage pull' really is." See Chris Lydgate & Nick
Budnick, Rubbish! Portland's Top Brass Said ItWas OK to Swipe Your Garbage-So We Grabbed
available
at
24,
2002,
ONLINE,
Dec.
WILLAMETTE
WK.
Theirs,
http://www.wweek.com/print.php?story=3485 (last visited May 23, 2005). (It is not clear from the
article whether these bi-monthly pulls have been taking place for three decades or since
Greenwood.) The reporters listed an inventory of the items discovered and quipped: "Invasion of
privacy? This is a frontal assault, a D-Day, a Norman Conquest of privacy. We know the chiefs
credit-card number; we know where he buys his groceries; we know how much toilet tissue he goes
through." Id. When the reporters revealed what they had done and the fruits of their haul, the Police
Chief remarked, "This is very cheap," and despite earlier support of the notion that trash is public
property, the Mayor threatened to take legal action. Id.
40. 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001). Because the hospital at issue was a state hospital, "the members
of the staff are government actors, subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
41. Id.
at 93 & n.1(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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abandoned it."' 42 Justice Scalia makes a sound, principled argument-if
the urine is exposed to the public like the bank records in Miller or the
garbage left at the curb in Greenwood, then the Court's precedent
establishes that it is open for the government's taking and any
subsequent testing is not within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
C. FederalandState DNA DatabaseLegislation
The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 ("DNA
Act") 43 compels individuals convicted of any federal felony and certain

offenses including murder, voluntary manslaughter, offenses relating to
sexual abuse, child abuse, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, and offenses
relating to peonage and slavery44 who are incarcerated, on parole,
probation, or supervised release to provide federal authorities with "a
tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample" for the purpose of conducting an
"analysis of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) identification
information." 45 Furthermore, the USA PATRIOT ACT 46 adds acts of
terrorism to the list of DNA collection triggering felonies.47 Every state
now operates a DNA collection program and these programs are
expanding nationwide.48
It is important to understand the scientific precision of DNA
identification and the technology law enforcement has developed to
utilize it in order to fully appreciate the debate over the expansion of
DNA databases. Once the FBI receives the qualified federal offender's
sample, they extract a "genetic fingerprint" through short tandem repeat
technology ("STR") which detects the presence of genic variants known
42. Id. Justice Scalia understood that "some would argue... that testing of urine is prohibited
by some generalized privacy right 'emanating' from the 'penumbras' of the Constitution"; however,
he noted that "it is not even arguable that the testing of urine that has been lawfully obtained is a
Fourth Amendment search." Id.
43. Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000).
44. 42 U.S.C.S. § 14135a(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2241 48 (Law. Co-op.
1991 & LexisNexis Supp. 2005). Conviction for conspiracy to commit the aforementioned crimes
also triggers compulsion of a DNA sample. 42 U.S.C.S. § 14135a(d)(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
45. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 14135a(a)(l)-(2), (c)(1)-(2) (LexisNexis 2004).
46. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 503, 115 Stat. 272,
364 (2001).
47. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) for a laundry list of such
offenses, including the destruction of aircraft, the murder of foreign officials, use of weapons of
mass destruction, and the sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel.
48. See State DNA Database Laws Qualifying Offenses (as of June 2004), at
see also
http://www.dnaresource.com/Table%20of/2OState%20DNA%2OLaws%20-%202004.pdf;
Legislation & State Statutes: All Felon DNA Database Expansion Bills That Have Passed, at
http://www.dnaresource.com/bill tracking list.htm (last visited May 23, 2005).
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as alleles located at thirteen specific loci on DNA present in the
specimen.4 9 Due to the number of alleles present at each locus and the
"wide-spread variances in their representation among human beings, the
chance that two randomly selected individuals will share the same
profile are infinitesimal., 50 The resulting profile is then loaded into the
FBI's Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS"), comprised of DNA
profiles from federal, state, and territorial DNA collection programs, as
well as profiles from crime-scene evidence, unidentified remains, and
genetic samples voluntarily provided by relatives of missing persons. 5'
As of March 2005, CODIS contained 2,380,458 total profiles, comprised
of 2,277,056 convicted offender profiles and 103,402 forensic profiles.5 z
All fifty states, the U.S. Army, the FBI, and Puerto Rico contribute
profiles to CODIS.53
Additionally, many state contributors collect DNA upon conviction
of felonies outside of the federal model (such as drug crimes), twenty-six
collect DNA upon conviction of some misdemeanors, and Virginia,
Texas, and Louisiana collect DNA from all arrestees. 54 Presently, no
DNA collection statute calls for collection from the general public. The
reason that the general public is currently excluded is because law
enforcement has uniformly collected DNA through blood or saliva
samples which have been found sufficiently intrusive under the Katz
progeny to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.55
D. Application of Katz Progeny to Intrusive DNA Collection
Although the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari on a Fourth
Amendment challenge to DNA collection, many lower federal and state
courts have analyzed this issue in the context of the aforementioned
DNA database statutes. The Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, along
with many federal district courts and two state supreme courts, have
upheld existing DNA collection statutes under a "special needs
49. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, No. 04-7253,
2005 U.S. LEXIS 2505 (Mar. 21, 2005).
50. See id. at 818-19 (citing Nat'l Comm. for the Future of DNA Evidence, Nat'l Inst. Of
Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Future of Forensic DNA Testing 35, Nov. 2000, available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/183697.pdf).
51. See 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 14132(a)(1)-(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005).
52. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, NDIS Statistics, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/
clickmap.htm (last visited May 23, 2005).
53. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, NDIS Participants, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/
partstates.htm (last visited May 23, 2005).
54. See State DNA Database Laws Qualifying Offenses, supra note 48.
55.

See infra Part I.D.
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analysis. 56 Alternatively, the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, as well
as many federal district courts, and a variety of state courts "have
approved compulsory DNA profiling under a traditional assessment of
reasonableness gauged by the totality of the circumstances." 57 Presently,
no court has found that DNA collection is outside the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection.
In Rise v. Oregon, a convicted murderer challenged the
constitutionality of Oregon's DNA database statute requiring persons
convicted of murder, a sexual offense, or conspiracy or attempt to
commit a sexual offense to submit a blood sample to the Oregon
Department of Corrections. 58 Due to the fact that the collection method
involved the non-consensual extraction of blood, the court had little
difficulty finding that the statute "implicates Fourth Amendment privacy
rights" under Skinner.5 9 However, in the course of conducting a
reasonableness-balancing,
the court found that the "information
derived from the blood sample is substantially the same as that derived
from fingerprinting-an identifying marker unique to the individual
from whom the information is derived.",6 1 All other courts that have
analyzed DNA collection through blood
samples have found the
62
collection invokes the Fourth Amendment.
The analysis becomes more interesting when less intrusive DNA
collection methods are at issue. In United States v. Nicolosi, the court
considered the constitutionality of a subpoena directing an indicted
suspect to produce samples of his saliva.63 The court found that
compelled saliva samples fall in the middle of the intrusiveness and
public exposure "continuum," somewhere between "voice, hair and
handwriting samples" which are "in the public domain" and
consequently may be obtained without implicating "any privacy or
dignity interests," and blood samples "which could only be obtained by
extracting them from the body." 64 The court observed that although
56. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 830 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, No. 04-7253,
2005 U.S. LEXIS 2505 (Mar. 21, 2005).
57. Id. at 831. The decision in Kincade added the Ninth Circuit to list provided by the court.

See id. at 832.
58.

59 F.3d 1556, 1558 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1160 (1996).

59. See id. at 1558-59.
60. See id. at 1559.
61. Id.
62.

See, e.g., Landry v. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d. 1085, 1090 (Mass. 1999), cert. denied,

Landry v. Reilly, 528 U.S. 1073 (2000); People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Il1. App. Ct.
1994).
63. 885 F. Supp. 50, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
64. Id. at 55.
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saliva contains "a significant amount of genetic identity information"
which the suspect may understandably expect to be private,
"expectorating is not ... concealed behind closed doors as urinating., 65
In the end, the court looked to the intrusiveness of the process of
obtaining a saliva sample and found that "swabbing the inside of the
' 66
subject's mouth with a pad" implicates "dignitary interests.
Apparently, the court avoided the public exposure doctrine through an
application of the intrusiveness paradigm reminiscent of Cupp, stating
that the swabbing procedure
is "clearly a search within the skin, if not
67
it."
beneath
literally
The Supreme Court of Vermont expressly rejected the Nicolosi
decision. 68 The court found the public exposure doctrine unavoidable,
stating that, "[a]lthough the inside of one's mouth is often hidden from
public view, exposing it does not entail ... embarrassment" and "by
talking and yawning, we frequently expose the interior of our mouth to
public view." 69 Consequently, the saliva sample was found more
"similar to the characteristics of fingerprinting as described in Davis"
and only reasonable suspicion was required.7 ° It is notable that the
court's disagreement is dependent on the perceived physical
intrusiveness of the collection method.7' Viewed collectively, these
cases expose the shortcomings of existing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in addressing the constitutionality of non-intrusive DNA
collection methods where no dignitary interests are implicated.

65.

Id. (noting the "commonplace sight of athletes expectorating on national television on a

daily basis.").

66. Id.
67.

See id. For a discussion of Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), see supra notes 18-19

and accompanying text.
68.

In re Nontestimonial Identification Order, 762 A.2d. 1239, 1247 (Vt. 2000).

69. Id. at 1244. Nevertheless, the nontestimonial identification order procedure falls within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment because it requires an in-custody detention of the person. See
id.
at 1245.
70. Id. at 1247.
71. In a similar context, the majority of jurisdictions have extended the public exposure
rationale to instances where law enforcement shines an ultraviolet lamp on an arrestee's skin to
expose chemicals transferred from stolen money. See United States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842,
845 (6th Cir. 1968); State v. Holzapfel, 748 P.2d 953, 957 (Mont. 1988) (citing Commonwealth v.
DeWitt, 314 A.2d 27, 30-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973)). But see People v. Santistevan, 715 P.2d 792,
794-95 (Colo. 1986). In State v. Hardaway, the Supreme Court of Montana limited Holzapfel,

distinguishing the swabbing of blood off an injured burglary suspect's hands and DNA processing
as a "search" because "[w]hile his hands and the blood upon them were exposed to the public for
viewing, it was not the viewing that constituted the search; it was the swabbing." 36 P.3d 900, 907

(Mont. 2001). This is yet another example of a DNA case decided on the familiar crutch of the
intrusiveness doctrine and the physicality of the search.
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TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS RENDER THE INTRUSIVENESS
PARADIGM IRRELEVANT

For the courts discussed above, the Fourth Amendment question
centered on the physicality of the DNA collection method involved and
whether the resulting bodily integrity, and dignitary interests invaded,
contravened reasonable expectations of privacy. These opinions
effectively decided the cases before them, making it unfair to
characterize them as shortsighted, yet the technological advancement of
DNA collection science in the years that followed has potentially
rendered their analyses irrelevant.72 Indeed, when the threshold question
is revisited with these advancements in mind, a considerable amount of
doubt is cast on whether DNA collection continues to constitute a search
within the scope of Fourth Amendment protection at all. This possibility
has not gone unnoticed, and indications of judicial anxiety towards DNA
collection and technological advancement in general have resurfaced as
a result.
A.

Advancements in DNA Collection and the FingerprintAnalogy

Scholars have noted that "[i]n light of rapid technological
advancements ... DNA may soon be extracted with virtually no bodily
intrusion." 73 The premise is simple. Our bodies constantly shed skin
cells which contain DNA, rendering it "almost impossible to not leave
some genetic legacy of yourself behind everyday., 74 As discussed above
in the context of lower court DNA database decisions, DNA was initially
extracted through an undeniably intrusive blood sample. However,
technology has continued its inevitable march forward, and the potential
for non-intrusive DNA collection methods has emerged.
It is not surprising to even a casual Law & Order or CSI television
program fan that the police are readily capable of collecting hair samples

72.
73.

See infra Part II.A.
Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope

of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 144 (2001).

74. See Symposium, The Human Genome Project,DNA Science and the Law: The American
Legal System 's Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science; Panel Two: CriminalLaw and DNA
Science: Balancing Societal Interests and Civil Liberties, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 401, 421 (2002). Dr. F.

Samuel Baechtel of the FBI DNA Unit expanded on this assertion, stating to his audience: "The cup
you drank your coffee from, the cigarette you had at break, the shirt you took off yesterday... I can
pick up your DNA types off the collars of your shirt, the baseball hat you wore in here... [t]he
tissue you blew your nose on and tossed in the trash can." Id.
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75
and bodily fluids from crime scenes for DNA identification purposes.
Perhaps more surprisingly, law enforcement in now able to extract DNA
without any "sub-dermal physical intrusion" simply by applying a
"sticky patch" to the skin on an individual's forearm, removing it a
moment later, and collecting the epidermal cells left in the process.76 As
the technology continues to develop, it has become apparent that a mere
fingerprint may be sufficient to collect an accurate DNA sample."
Accordingly, it is foreseeable that DNA will soon be collected with the
same negligible amount of physical intrusiveness as the Davis Court
found fingerprinting to constitute.78 Therefore, DNA may eventually be
collected in a completely non-intrusive, inoffensive manner when
obtained during a field test or left in a public place where no seizure of
the person is required.79
Of course, there is a notable difference between DNA and
fingerprints in the private information DNA has the potential to reveal.
Specifically, the impetus behind many anti-databanking advocates'
arguments is that DNA samples can be analyzed for "markers"
associated with congenital diseases, susceptibility to diseases, and,
potentially, behavioral traits and psychiatric conditions as well. 80 These

75. See Ben Quarmby, The Case for National DNA Identification Cards, 2003 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 2 (2003); CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (CBS); Law & Order (Wolf Films & NBC
Universal Television Studio).
76. Quamby, supra note 75 (asserting that for this reason modem DNA sampling methods no
longer "violate reasonable societal expectations of privacy"); see also David H. Kaye, Michael E.
Smith & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Is a DNA Identification Database in Your Future?, 16 CRIM.
JUST. 4, 9 (2001).
77. See, e.g., Roland A.H. van Oorschot & Maxwell K. Jones, DNA Fingerprintsfrom
Fingerprints,387 NATURE 767 (1997) (The article summarizes experiments which have revealed
that "an individual's genetic profile can now also be generated from swabs taken from objects
touched by hands, providing a new tool for crime scene investigations.").
78. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
79. For example, Boston police retrieved DNA from a cigarette provided to a prisoner
suspected of murder and the NYPD has retrieved DNA samples from a suspect's coffee cup, see
Richard Willing, As Police Rely More on DNA, States Take a Closer Look, USA TODAY, June 6,
2000, at AI, as well as from the saliva a crack addict suspected of being a serial strangler spat onto
the street. See Christopher Francescani, Sex Fiend Admits He Killed 5 In Brooklyn, N.Y. POST, Mar.
10, 2001, at 11. Professor David H. Kaye, an authority on the use of DNA in the criminal justice
system, recounted a story of an individual who pled guilty to rape after an enterprising police officer
invited the suspect to Taco Bell, bought him a soft drink and used the straw to recover inculpatory
DNA evidence. See Symposium, supra note 74, at 409-10.
80. See, e.g., Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 73, at 156; Press Release, American Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU of New Jersey Wins Victory In DNA Law Challenge (Dec. 22, 2004), at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=17236&c=27 ("The law threatens the privacy of
thousands of New Jerseyans and their relatives by collecting personal and confidential information
and maintaining it in a database, the ACLU argued in court."). For a discussion of genetic markers,
see Susanna Annumen et al., An Allele of COL9A2 Associated with IntervertebralDisc Disease, 285
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concerns are derivative of those expressed in Skinner regarding the
private medical facts which may potentially be revealed through urine
analysis. 8'
This argument is more attenuated in the DNA context because the
DNA used by law enforcement is used exclusively for identification
purposes. The thirteen core STR loci used in criminal offender databases
are each found on non-genic stretches of DNA known as "junk DNA"
not linked to any genes that would permit an onlooker to discern any
socially stigmatizing conditions or private medical facts.82 Furthermore,
the profile of an individual's DNA molecule that is stored in CODIS is a
series of randomly assigned numbers-mitigating the potential for abuse
by unauthorized viewers. 83 Additionally, the DNA Act provides
protections against misuse of genetic information by strictly limiting the
permissible uses of DNA profiles and stored samples, as well as
providing criminal penalties for improper disclosure or receipt. 84 As of
yet, there are no known instances of the disclosure of DNA information
for the purposes of insurance or hiring. 85 Consequently, the argument
that DNA collection, analysis, and storage in a database is more
intrusive than in the fingerprint context is based primarily on an
unwillingness to trust that the government will use the samples
exclusively for its stated purpose, while preventing others from

SCIENCE 409, 409 (1999) (summarizing reports which indicate the importance of genetic factors in
intervertebral disc disease); Peter AIdhous, The Promise and Pitfalls of Molecular Genetics, 257
SCIENCE 164, 164-65 (1992) (discussing research efforts to find genetic markers that correlate with
high IQ, dyslexia, psychiatric diseases, and reading ability in children); Charles C. Mann,
Behavioral Genetics in Transition, 264 SCIENCE 1686, 1686-89 (1994) (noting that "there are signs
of a growing consensus that heredity plays some role in human behavior" in response to
"[m]ounting evidence from animal and human studies").
81. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
82. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, No. 04-7253,
2005 U.S. LEXIS 2505 (Mar. 21, 2005); accord David H. Kaye, Bioethics, Bench and Bar: Selected
Arguments in Landry v. Attorney General, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 198 (2000).
83. See D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases:Legality, Legitimacy,
and the Casefor Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 413, 431 (2003) ("The numbers
have no meaning except as a representation of molecular sequences at DNA loci that are not
indicative of an individual's personal traits or propensities.").
84. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3) (2004) (strictly limiting disclosure to criminal justice
agencies, judicial proceedings, criminal defense purposes and, on the condition that all personally
identifiable information is removed, for population statistics databases), with § 14135e (2004)
(providing a criminal penalty of "not more than $250,000, or imprison[ment] for a period of not
more than one year, or both" for knowingly disclosing or obtaining a sample in violation of
§ 14132(b)(3)).
85. See David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 179, 184 (2001).
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accessing the treasure trove of private information stored DNA samples
may contain.
B. The Threshold Question Revisited
Initially, scholarly analysis of DNA collection centered on its
"reasonableness" under the Forth Amendment because the taking of
blood samples was the only collection method analyzed.86 More
recently, the sentiment has emerged that although the aforementioned
advancements in DNA collection likely will not constitute a search
under the Supreme Court's "intrusiveness" case line, the unique nature
of DNA and the privacy interests potentially implicated justify an
inferential leap necessitating Fourth Amendment protections.87
However, the suggestion has been made that if a DNA extraction
procedure was developed that made it "virtually impossible to extract
sensitive information" used for anything other than identification
purposes, then the Fourth Amendment would no longer be invoked.8 8
Nevertheless, perhaps as a remnant of the blood sample days, scholars
often continue to fail to address the threshold question at all. 89 Further

86. See, e.g., John P. Cronan, The Next Frontier of Law Enforcement: A Proposalfor
Complete DNA Databanks,28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 119, 143 (2000) ("At the outset, it is important to
note that DNA collection constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment."); Rothstein &
Carnahan, supra note 73, at 136 ("Courts typically interpret the Fourth Amendment to require a
warrant where bodily intrusion is involved.").
87. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionalityof DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 455, 480 (2001) (Although "it is possible that taking saliva or epidermal cells will not
be considered a search ... [t]he better view is that all the forms of DNA sampling ... should be
denominated searches... [because of] the nature of the information derived from the cells."
(footnote omitted)); Kaye & Smith, supra note 83, at 444 ("[T]he sensitive nature of some of the
information locked in the helices of the DNA molecule leads us to believe that DNA sampling is a
Fourth Amendment search, even if the sample is obtained noninvasively."); Jonathan F. Will,
Comment, DNA as Property:Implications on the Constitutionalityof DNA Dragnets, 65 U. Pirr L.
REV. 129, 135 (2003) ("Given the nature of the information contained in one's DNA, it is likely that
society would find it reasonable to expect privacy in this area.").
88. Kaye, supra note 87, at 482 (providing the example of "miniaturized DNA chips that
could probe only non-functional STR loci and that would destroy the DNA once it has been
analyzed and the alleles recorded").
89. See, e.g., Michael P. Jewkes, Note, Just Scratching the Surface: DNA Sampling Prior to
Arrest and the Fourth Amendment, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 125, 144 (2001) ("The Fourth
Amendment subjects DNA sampling, like any other form of search and seizure, to the constraints of
reasonableness."); Rebecca Sasser Peterson, Note, DNA Databases: When Fear Goes Too Far, 37
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219, 1229 (2000) ("The most difficult constitutional issues concerning
databases are Fourth Amendment challenges."); Bonnie L. Taylor, Comment, Storing DNA Samples
of Non-Convicted Persons and the Debate over DNA Database Expansion, 20 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 509, 516 (2003) ("The collection and testing of a DNA sample.., whether by the drawing of
blood, taking of saliva, or swabbing of the mouth-constitutes a search .... ").
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discussion in this area is required to develop the legal precedent
surrounding DNA collection and storage.
For example, it is arguable under the public exposure rationale
espoused in Miller that tissue samples taken for diagnostic medical tests
could be legally obtained without consent by the government because
the DNA information contained therein has been voluntarily disclosed to
a public institution. 90 Although this may seem outrageous, as Judge
Kozinski succinctly observed:
[I]t's hard to say that most of us have any expectation as to what
happens to our blood once it leaves our veins in the doctor's office; we
certainly don't expect it to be returned to us. Arguably, we have no
more reasonable expectation of privacy in blood turned over to third
91
parties and abandoned than we do in our trash cans or bank records.
Even those who argue for limitations on the use of DNA under the
rubric of Fourth Amendment protections have acknowledged that "[i]f
the government could take one's DNA without intrusion upon one's
personal security or privacy expectations, then, arguably, no Fourth
Amendment violation would exist." 92 With it all but inevitable that as
technology marches forward the actual method of DNA collection will
become less and less intrusive, it seems that Judge Kozinski was correct
in his analysis of the shortcomings of the intrusiveness doctrine,
observing that:
[A]s our techniques for extracting DNA improve and identifying
information can more easily be obtained from urine and saliva, or from
hair follicles inadvertently pulled out during a visit to the barber or
hairdresser... [and if, as a consequence] we have no legitimate
expectation of privacy in such bodily material, what possible
impediment can there be to having the government collect what we
leave behind,
extract its DNA signature and enhance CODIS to include
93
everyone?

90. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text; accord Symposium, supra note 74, at 410
(claiming that it is "far from clear" that the distinction between biological samples and financial
information would prevail).
91. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, No. 04-7253, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2505 (Mar. 21, 2005) (citing California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 39-41 (1988) and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976)).
92. Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 73, at 144.
93. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 873 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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C. Indications ofJudicialAnxiety Towards Technological
Advancement
Our common law legal system is most strained when existing law is
forced to "accommodate technological innovation." 94 Consequently, the
judiciary has always been wary of technology's ability to trump
precedent through unforeseen advancement.95 Indeed, when law
enforcement equips itself with new technology, the "judicial conscience"
is forced to balance the promise of greater crime-solving efficiency
against an intrusion beyond the contemplation of the drafters of the
Fourth Amendment. 96 As Justice Brandeis famously observed, the future
is in the care of the Constitution, and the Judiciary must make "provision
for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be
made" through a contemplation not only of "what has been but of what
may be."97
The present Supreme Court's anxiety regarding technological
advancement is highlighted by Kyllo v. United States.98 In Kyllo, the
Court analyzed "whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a
private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat
within the home constitutes a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment."" At first blush, the case appeared clearly governed by the
public exposure doctrine because "[h]eat waves, like aromas that are
generated in a kitchen, or in a laboratory or opium den, enter the public
domain if and when they leave a building."' 0 0 However, the majority rethis power of technology
framed the issue as "what limits there are upon
0
to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."' '
As a starting point, the Court identified the interior of one's home
as a privacy interest "with roots deep in the common law."'' 0 2 The Court
94. Gaia Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation: Identity, Genetic Testing, and
the Internet, 57 VAND. L. REv. 965, 966 (2004).
95. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of power,
must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world ... [because] [t]ime works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable
of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.").
96. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 871 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
97. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
98. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
99. Id. at 29.
100. Id. at 43-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 34. Consequently, the dissent found that "the Court 'takes the long view' and
decides this case based largely on the potential of yet-to-be-developed technology." Id. at 42
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 34.
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then observed that although the technology at issue was "relatively
crude," the decision "must take account of more sophisticated
systems.., in development."'0 3 On these grounds the Court held that
where "the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
10 4
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search."",
Revealingly, the Court justified its departure from the public-exposure
doctrine with pre-Katz precedent functioning under the historic propertyparadigm.' 05 This is an indication that at least four members of the Court
were reluctant to permit technological innovation to render Katz the
equivalent of a sleeping gatekeeper.
Nevertheless, Kyllo is not dispositive in determining whether nonintrusive DNA collection constitutes a "search." First, it is arguable that
Kyllo establishes "no more than that the use of technology that is
functionally equivalent to trespassing into a home to acquire information
is a search."'' 0 6 Furthermore, it is notable that the Fourth Amendment's
protections of searches of the person do not posses the common law
roots the Kyllo majority relied on to justify a reincarnation of the
property-paradigm in the interior of the home context. 10 7 Additionally,
the protection of the Kyllo rule potentially "dissipates as soon as the
relevant technology is 'in general public use." ' 10 8 Along these lines,
retail DNA kits are already available for at-home paternity testing. 109
Recently, similar judicial anxiety has been displayed towards the
expansion of DNA databases. In United States v. Kincade, the Ninth
Circuit sat en banc to determine the constitutionality of the DNA Act's
103. Id. at 36. Among the technological advancements that loomed large in Justice Scalia's
mind were a "Handheld Ultrasound Through the Wall Surveillance" device and a "Radar
Flashlight" he discovered while surfing the web. See id. at 37 n.3.
104.

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.

105. See id. at 31, 34, 37 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961)).
Recall that Silverman stood for the principle that the Fourth Amendment was only implicated if the
government physically trespassed on an individual's property, not whether governmental action
contravened theoretical expectations of privacy. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
106. Kaye & Smith, supra note 83, at 443.
107. See id. Recall that it was only 1966 when the Court stated in Schmerber that in "dealing
with intrusions into the human body.., we write on a clean slate." See id.; supra note 9 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Schmerber.
108. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion at 34). Justice
Stevens noted that the very thermal device at issue was "just an 800-number away from being
rented from 'halfa dozen national companies' by anyone who wants one." Id. at 47 n.5.
109. See, e.g., Intemational Paternity Labs, available at http://www.intemationalpatemity.com/
(advertising an "Easy to Use At-Home-DNA Collection Kit... complete with all the supplies
necessary to collect cheek cells from the alleged father, child and mother (mother optional)") (last
visited May 23, 2005).
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requirement that conditionally-released federal offenders provide blood
samples for the purpose of generating a DNA profile absent
individualized suspicion that they have committed additional crimes."O
Finding that the compelled blood sample constitutes a search under
Skinner,"1 the court determined that the appropriate Fourth Amendment12
test was reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances.'
Furthermore, the court found that the junk DNA generated profile
produced only a "record of the defendant's identity... [in] which the
qualified offender can claim no right of privacy."" 3 Accordingly, the
court dismissed the "parade of horribles the DNA Act's opponents fear"
including "unregulated disclosure of CODIS profiles to private parties"
and "genetic discrimination" as "dramatic Hollywood fantasies"
irrelevant to the contemplation of a rational court.14
Nevertheless, the court displayed its reluctance to permit DNA
collection of the general public. First, the court imported what it
characterized as the "constitutionally significant distinction between
searches of conditional releases and searches of the general public,"
provided by the Supreme Court in Ferguson, to justify its application of
the traditional reasonableness balancing test to the former." 5 The
majority went to great lengths to limit its holding to "lawfully
adjudicated criminals," while excluding "law-abiding citizens...
such as "newborns, students, [or]
passing through some transient status"
' 16
passengers in a car or on a plane." "
It is notable that although the Kincade court was forced to analyze
the DNA Act under the protections of the Fourth Amendment because a
blood sample was at issue, the majority neglected to address the
threshold question of what would happen if the sample were to derive
from less intrusive means. This omission was not overlooked by the
dissenters, who argued that "[t]o reduce the searches authorized by the
DNA Act to the physical act of taking blood" ignores "'the advance in
technology,""' 7 and therefore it "is important to recognize that the
Fourth Amendment intrusion here is not primarily the taking of the
blood, but seizure of the DNA fingerprint and its inclusion in a
110.
(Mar. 21,
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

379 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, No. 04-7253, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2505
2005).
Kincade, 379 F.3d at 821 n.15.
Id. at832.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 838. Ultimately, the Court found the DNA Act reasonable. See id. at 839.
Seeid.at832.
Id. at 835-36.
Id. at 867 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001)).
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searchable database." ' 18 Indeed, the majority's efforts to limit its holding
may be for naught considering the contribution it makes to the
fingerprint analogy in finding that the only private information a DNA
profile and sample reveals is an individual's identity." 9 This assertion is
particularly relevant in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision that
the "principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his
name" in the course of a valid Terry stop based on reasonable
suspicion. 2 ° Therefore, it is arguable that if DNA could be collected
non-intrusively on-site, profiled and quickly compared to the CODIS
database via a patrol car's computer, then state legislation could require
an individual to submit to DNA collection during the course of a Terry
stop under the theory that the DNA profile does not invoke the Fourth
Amendment and is equivalent to a name disclosure requirement for
identification purposes.
Regardless of the existing legal arguments, the final hurdle for
legislating DNA collection of the general public is societal acceptance.
At this time, DNA analysis is still a relatively new scientific
phenomenon to the general population. However, technological
advancements in DNA collection are rapidly becoming household
knowledge due to major media trials and the law enforcement shows
broadcast into our homes on a nightly basis. Consequently, it seems that
under the Katz standard, the question is not whether non-intrusive
governmental collection of DNA violates society's reasonable
expectation of privacy-but how much longer until people no longer
expect privacy from the non-intrusive governmental collection of their
DNA.
Once again, the fingerprint analogy is illuminative. Presently, the
FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System ("IAFIS")
database contains "over 47 million people, including prints 'acquired
related to a background check for employment, licensing, and other noncriminal justice purposes' and 'submitted voluntarily by state, local, and
federal law enforcement agencies.' 12 1 Nevertheless, as Judge Kozinski
points out, there is no outcry from civil libertarians because society has
"come to accept that people-even totally innocent people-have no
118. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 873 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
119. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
120. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2459 (2004). The Court reasoned that
the statute at issue "does not alter the nature of the stop itself: it does not change its duration or its
location." Id. (citation omitted).
121. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 874 (Kozinski, I., dissenting) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, IAFIS, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis.htm (last visited May 23,
2005)).
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122
legitimate expectation of privacy in their fingerprints, and that's that."
One can only speculate how long it will take before the public views
DNA profiling with similar indifference.

III.

CONFLICTING POLICY AND THE NECESSITY FOR SAFEGUARDS

As illustrated, a genuine constitutional controversy exists over
whether the non-intrusive collection of DNA samples and the
subsequent storage of these samples in DNA databases constitutes a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This controversy
will only add fuel to the hot debate between law enforcement advocates
and civil libertarians over the expansion of DNA databases. In
determining what role the Supreme Court should take in resolving this
political dispute, should it grant a petition for certiorari, it is helpful to
understand fundamental legal theory discerning the appropriate role of
the judicial and legislative branches in resolving constitutional
controversies.
Scholars have long identified Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
and his "two-sided" view of the judicial role, characterized as the
conflicting philosophies of "judicial self-restraint" and "judicial
activism," as a paradigm for analyzing the judiciary's role in deciding
constitutional controversies. 12 This distinction is best illustrated by
Holmes's call for the reform of "survivals. 124 Survivals are legal
doctrines whose original policy basis has disappeared, but nevertheless
survive through "inertia" and are given "new and unconvincing
explanations."'' 25 To Holmes, the new justifications for survivals must be
126
highly scrutinized, and if found unsatisfactory they should be revised.
However, Holmes believed that the appropriate means of survival reform
was the legislature rather than the judiciary. 27 Holmes understood that
the judiciary was not equipped to make sweeping policy determinations
in the absence of sound legal precedent because the policy adopted
would be largely "the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and
inarticulate convictions."' 28
122. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 874.
123. See, e.g., Edward McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Dilemma of Judicial PolicyMaking, 39 MINN. L. REV. 837, 837 (1955).
124. Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The Holmesian Judge in Theory and Practice, 37
WM. & MARY L. REV. 19, 28 (1995) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 33

(Mark D.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Howe ed., 1963) (n.p. 1881)).
See Grey, supra note 124, at 28-29.
Id.
Id.
at 31.
HOLMES, supra note 124, at 32.
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In contrast to the judicial self-restraint encouraged when dealing
with survivals, the Holmesian judge is encouraged to be activist when
the underlying policy of a doctrine is sound, yet the factual
circumstances have changed to create a gap in the law. 129 In these
situations, "judges must make law on the basis of policy and ... they
should do so explicitly."' 30 After thorough consideration, if the judge is
faced with a decision between conflicting policies, it is the judge's role
"to exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice" and engage in judicial
legislation. 13 ' Essentially, the decision to exercise self-restraint or
judicial activism depends on a matter of degree and philosophy. This
distinction remains vital today in the ongoing debate between legal
activists and populist majoritarians over the role of the judiciary in
resolving constitutional controversies such as the expansion of DNA
databases.
A.

The Clash of Compelling Interests

Fundamentally, the topic of expansion of the CODIS DNA database
provokes a personal response driven by one's opinion regarding the
appropriate balance between governmental power and civil liberties. It
comes as no surprise that the law enforcement community, including
such prominent voices as former New York City Police Commissioner
Howard Safir, has called for continued expansion of DNA databases
from the outset. 32 The success of the CODIS system certainly
legitimizes their argument-as of March 2005, CODIS has produced
over 21,200 hits assisting in more than 23,000 investigations. 133 It is
undeniable that a population-wide DNA database "would revolutionize
law enforcement" by increasing prosecutors' success rates and providing
129. Grey, supra note 124, at 33 (interpreting Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221
(1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
130. Grey, supra note 124, at 24.
13 1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 210, 239 (1920) (originally appearing at 12 HARV. L. REV. 443 (1899)).
132. See John Kifner, Safir Says DNA Proposal Would Cut Property Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

13, 1998, at 51 (reporting that Safir's plan would call on the New York Legislature to consider
expanding the New York State databanking law to allow DNA collection from every person
arrested); Jayson Blair, Police Chiefs Join in Callfor More DNA Sampling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
1999, at B5 (reporting that the "leadership of a worldwide association of police agencies" proposed
a resolution urging "the Federal Government to create a national database based on samples
collected at the time of arrest").
133. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Measuring Success, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/
success.htm (last visited May 23, 2005). "CODIS's primary metric, the 'Investigation Aided,' is
defined as a case that CODIS assisted through a hit (a match produced by CODIS that would not
otherwise have been developed)." Id.
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a formidable deterrent to would-be criminals. 34 Additionally, the
Executive Director of the National Institute of Justice's National
Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence noted that programs using
DNA evidence to exonerate those wrongfully convicted illuminates a
problem that would be greatly diminished if DNA databanks were
established to verify identity in the first place. 135 These arguments were
bolstered by the impetus of the World Trade Center disaster, promoting
noted scholar Alan Dershowitz to speculate that most Americans would
the benefits a "near foolproof
not object to a loss of privacy in light of
36
system of identification" could provide.'
On the other hand, critics of DNA database expansion cry out that a
universal database constitutes a "step toward an Orwellian society,' 37
that will render us a "nation of suspects."' 38 To many, the enthusiasm of
the law enforcement community's advocacy evokes Justice Brandeis's
eloquent warning that:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. 139
In other words, the critics see the CODIS success rate and the
appeal to our collective fear of hidden terrorist cells lurking in our midst
as a potential Trojan horse. After all, once the government possesses
"private information about the intimate details of our lives" the balance
of power will be profoundly altered and the population made

134.
135.

See Cronan, supra note 86, at 156.
See Symposium, supra note 74, at 406 ("You have to commit yourself to utilizing DNA

technology on the front end so that you get the right person in the first place. We don't want to wait

until ten years after someone's been convicted to utilize DNA technology ....

) (quoting Chris

Asplen).
136. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Identification Please, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 11, 2002, at 14,

available at 2002 WLNR 2565908 ("The need for security in this age of terrorism demands that the
legal status of everyone in this country be unambiguously clear.").
137.

See Jean E. McEwen, Sherlock Holmes Meets Genetic Fingerprinting,B.C. L. SCH. MAG.,

Spring 1994, at 49.
138. See Jean E. McEwen, DNA DataBanks, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 231, 236 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).

139.

See, e.g., Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 73, at 169 (quoting Olmstead v. United

States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Peterson, supra note 89, at 1219

(quoting Olmstead,277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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vulnerable. 40 This sentiment rehashes concerns over the potential for
by employers and insurers privy to this private
genetic discrimination
14 1
information.

The goal of this Note is not to express an opinion on the expansion
of CODIS to the general population, but merely to suggest that such an
expansion is feasible under existing constitutional precedent. Regardless
of which side of the spectrum we as individuals fall on, most of us
would agree that safeguards are necessary in order to limit the future use
of DNA databanks. This Note will discuss two methods to do so, the
first through judicial activism filling the gaps in existing precedent, and
the second through populist deference to the will of the majority through
their elected representatives.
B.

The Activist Approach: Reinforce the Threshold Question.With New
Katz Paradigms

Judicial activism is commonly defined as "the practice by judges of
disallowing policy choices by other governmental officials or institutions
that the Constitution does not clearly prohibit."'' 42 Legal pragmatists
endorse judicial activism under the belief that judges are "the socially
designated experts" in resolving problematic situations. 43 Accordingly,
pragmatists adopt Holmes's gap-filling concept and argue that there will
always be factual circumstances beyond the comprehension of existing
to make forward looking law with the aim of
precedent, requiring judges
144
bettering social welfare.

It is clear that if the judiciary is to maintain control over the
expansion of DNA profiling, then non-intrusive DNA collection must be
accommodated. "Constitutional doctrines have life cycles. They are born
of practical need, flourish in an atmosphere of general utility, and
decline as changing conditions drain them of their vitality."'' 45 In order
for the intrusiveness and public exposure doctrines to remain relevant in
140. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 843 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
(citing Daniel J. Solove, DigitalDossiers and the Dissipationof Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1105 (2002)).
141. See Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 73, at 158; Teresa K. Baumann, Note, Proxy
Consent and a National DNA Database:An Unethicaland DiscretionaryCombination, 86 IOWA L.
REv. 667, 681-87 (2001).
142. Lino A. Graglia, It's Not Constitutionalism,It's JudicialActivism, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 293, 296 (1996).
143. Grey, supra note 124, at 22.
144. Id.
145. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of CriminalProcedure, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1153, 1153 (1998).
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the DNA context, gaps in the law must be mended to permit these
doctrines to evolve alongside technological advancement. However, if
the policies underlying the intrusiveness and public exposure doctrines
have disappeared in the non-intrusive DNA collection context, then
these doctrines are rightly characterized as "survivals," and reform
should come from the legislature.
One way for courts to fill the gap in Fourth Amendment protection
between intrusive and non-intrusive DNA collection would be to cease
defining intrusiveness by the physicality of the collection method, but
rather by the sensitive nature of the material collected) 46 This shift is the
pragmatic choice because it is the most defensive of an individual's
genetic privacy and justifies the limitation on the basis of the protection
sought. However, this is a fine line because it effectively alters the
analysis from traditionally Fourth Amendment protected bodily integrity
to the sort of "generalized privacy right 'emanating' from the penumbras
dismissed as principally unfounded by Justice Scalia
of the Constitution"
47
in Ferguson.1
In the alternative, perhaps things have gone full circle to the point
where the pre-Katz property-trespass paradigm is more appropriate and
DNA should be viewed "as the property of its originator."'' 48 This
alternative is reminiscent of the Court's reliance on pre-Katz precedent
149
in response to the technological advancement at issue in Kyllo.
However, the feasibility of this alternative is diminished because if the
unintentional shedding of skin cells is characterized as an abandonment,
then additional limitations would need to be placed on the public
exposure doctrine in order to prevent law enforcement from utilizing
technological advancements that will permit the collection of the
public's skin cells from public areas unprotected by general privateproperty laws.

146.

See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)

(arguing that it is important to recognize that the Fourth Amendment intrusion "is not primarily the
taking of the blood, but seizure of the DNA fingerprint and its inclusion in a searchable database"),
cert. denied, No. 04-7253, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2505 (Mar. 21, 2005).

147. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra
note 42 and accompanying text for further discussion.
148. See Will, supra note 87, at 139-41.
149. See supra note 105 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001).
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C. The PopulistApproach: The Callfor Legislation
Populist majoritarianism is the belief that "[i]f democracy is to
reign, the people must prevail."'150 In other words, populists seek a larger
role for the elected branches in ascertaining constitutional meaning
where the people, through their elected representatives, settle
controversial cases of constitutional meaning.' 5' Accordingly, populists
adopt Holmes' theory of self-restraint, relegating the office of judge to
the application of preexisting law to facts, and finding that "[t]he
legislator alone is authorized to make new law based on policy and
anticipated consequences.' 52 Specifically, populists believe that
"personal and partial judicial opinions about policy and fairness have no
proper place in the decisional process.' 53 To them, judicial activism
imposes "the will of the 'nine old men' on the prime representatives of
the people, the legislature."'15 4 It is important to note that the populist
approach is not results-oriented. As celebrated constitutional scholar
Mark Tushnet asserts, populism "means the enactment into public policy
of the people's views, whatever they happen to be."'5 15 Consequently,
"the way we explore our
populist constitutionalism can be viewed as
156
national self-identity in the political realm."'
The populist approach argues that the Court inappropriately
partakes in "undignified partisan controversy" when it uses its office to
take sides in "the political conflicts of the age.' 5 7 For this reason,
majoritarianism is commonly associated with the conservative theory
that "sweeping judicial solutions" to constitutional controversies are
inappropriate forms of "social engineering" where the Court is "acting as
a superlegislature."' 58 There are several considerations that lend
credence to the populist argument. First, courts are "confined within the
bounds of a particular record" and therefore only "fragments of a social
159
problem are seen through the narrow windows of a litigation."
150. Robert Justin Lipkin, The New Majoritarianism,69 U. CIN. L. REv. 107, 109 (2000).
151.

Id. at 113.

152.
153.
154.
155.

Grey, supra note 124, at 2 1.
Id.
McWhinney, supra note 123, at 845.
Mark Tushnet, Commentarieson Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away from the

Courts: Response: Politics, National Identity, and the Thin Constitution, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 545,

553 (2000).
156. Id. at 554.
157. McWhinney, supra note 123, at 845.
158. Lipkin, supra note 150, at 124.
159. Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of "JudicialActivism,"
92 CAL. L. REv. 1441, 1453 (2004).
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Second, the Court is "an unelected and virtually unaccountable
institution."' 60 For these reasons, Tushnet emphasizes that courts make
mistakes and often resolve constitutional controversies in a manner that
does not truly reflect the will of the majority, either by under-enforcing
"values that legislatures would vigorously enforce" or over-enforcing
other values, "thereby depriving the people of our power to govern
ourselves."161
If the Supreme Court were to adopt an activist approach resembling
any of this Note's proposed new Katz paradigms, then it would risk the
appearance of results-oriented decision-making. It is for this very reason
that Justice Scalia characterized Katz as a "notoriously unhelpful test,"
which has only established that the "'expectations of privacy' that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' bear an uncanny
resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers
reasonable."' 162 In light of the equally compelling policy interests in
disagreement over the expansion of the CODIS system, the empirical
question is anything but clear cut. Rather than permitting the Court to
conduct an independent determination, perhaps the "proper role [of]
judges in a democratic society" would be to leave such "important
questions" of policy to the "good judgment, not of [the] Court, but of the
people through their representatives in the legislature.' 6 3
Furthermore, the legislature is in a better position to implement
genetic privacy safeguards to further protect sensitive genetic
information from being exploited. Even if the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on a non-intrusive DNA collection case and multiple amicus
curiae briefs were filed, the Court's holding would still be limited to the
facts in the record. 64 Conversely, Congress can engage in a more
extensive fact-finding initiative and field the concerns of a wider range
of parties with direct political influence on the substance of proposed
legislation.' 65 One safeguard that Congress is particularly better suited to
160. Lipkin, supra note 150, at 116.
161.

MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 126 (1999).

162. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted)
(describing Katz as a "self-indulgent" test that has "no plausible foundation" within the text of the
Fourth Amendment).
163. Id. at 97-98. Under the "political process theory," if a procedure "systematically and
meaningfully affects the average member of a community, and that community's political
representatives support that procedure, that's strong evidence that the procedure violates no
reasonable privacy expectation." Kahan & Meares, supra note 145, at 1174.
164. Lipkin, supra note 150, at 117.
165. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1223 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987), for the assertion that the legislature is able to
evaluate "with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts").
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address than the judiciary is the harmonization of state and federal DNA
statutes under a governing security provision--either by "front-loading"
and confining the government to "collecting and retaining the minimum
of information that is needed for identification purposes," or "backloading" and ensuring that the government keeps the information "in its
own hands... to use it only as authorized.' ' 166 It is not the goal of this
Note to propose what such legislation should look like, but merely to
suggest that the legislature is best equipped to create new laws
addressing the constitutionality of non-intrusive DNA collection,
alleviate CODIS critics' concerns, and permit our national identity to
dictate precisely what "reasonable expectations of privacy" entail.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the legality of DNA collection and the parameters of the CODIS
system continue to be challenged across the country, we must be mindful
of the technological advancements likely to come to fruition in the near
future. The current body of precedent has retained a single-minded focus
on the limitations the Fourth Amendment places on the collection and
storage of DNA profiles and samples. This authority is at risk of
becoming moot shortly after the time of its inception due to foreseeable
challenges to the scope of the Fourth Amendment apparent on the
horizon.
In order to set lasting limitations on the collection, use, and storage
of DNA profiles and samples, change is necessary. The Supreme Court's
current constitutional doctrines defining what constitutes a search
requiring Fourth Amendment protection do not contemplate the ability
to collect sensitive genetic information without any intrusion into an
individual's bodily integrity or offense to personal dignity. If these
doctrines are to remain vital, then they too must evolve along with the
technology that defies them.
However, this evolution may not be possible on the authority of the
Katz principle and its progeny without the judiciary engaging in
unwarranted judicial activism and speculating on what our nation's
reasonable expectations of privacy are on the basis of personal policy
preferences. If this is the case, then the responsibility for creating the
contours of law enforcement's permissible use of DNA should rest with
the legislature. Unquestionably, universal governing provisions must be
established to safeguard against the potential misuse of highly sensitive

166.

See Kaye, supra note 87, at 506.
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genetic information. Yet ultimately, the controversial questions over
whether non-intrusive DNA collection constitutes a search within the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection, and which members of our
society should have their profiles included in the CODIS database,
should be decided by edifying the public of the compelling interests on
both sides of the debate and permitting the collective voice of the
democratic process to speak.
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